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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
CHARLES STEVEN ARCHULETTA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15919 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information with one 
count of rape and one count of forcible sodomy in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 and 403, respectively. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In a trial before a jury presided over by the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., conducted on June 1 and 
2, 1978, in the Third Judicial District, appellant was found 
guilty of forcible sodomy. Appellant was accordingly 
sentenced to a term of 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent urges this Court to sustain the 
conviction and sentence of appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the evening of September 27, 1977, Michelle s. 
Christiansen and several of her girlfriends were returning 
home from a picnic when they noticed appellant driving a 
pick-up truck on a parallel course (T. at 15, 137, and 147). 
A conversation started and appellant invited Ms. Christiansen 
and her friends to a party (T. at 16). The women followed 
appellant to the site of the party where he left his truck 
and rode with them as they drove home to change clothes 
(T. at 17). One of the women, Diane Visick, decided not to 
return to the party, but allowed Michelle and her friend 
Lisa Don Thornwall to return with appellant in her (Ms. 
Visick's) car (T. at 17,18). The three purchased some 
beer and then went to the party for a short while (T. at 18 
and 154). Although marijuana was being used at the party 
(T. at 18 and 155), Ms. Christiansen denies having smoked 
any (T. at 37). None of the other witnesses could say 
whether she had had any or not (T. at 125 and 155). 
Appellant, Michelle S. Christiansen, and Lisa 
Don Thornwall, then left the party and drove to an area 
in the vicinity of the State Capitol Building where they 
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continued to drink beer (T. at 19). Both girls were kissing 
appellant (T. at 20 and 157). Mi'chell Ch · t' e ris iansen testified: 
. And then Charley (Appellant) asked 
us if we had ever taken vitamin pills 
to coat your stomach so that you don't 
get drunk, you don't get sick from 
drinking. And I said, "yeah". And he 
said, "Do you want to take some?" And 
I said, "no. " And then he took some. 
And so I thought, well, that's probably 
what they are, so Lisa Don and I took 
a pill from him. 
(T. at 19). 
She noted that the pill was football-shaped and 
green, of a jelly compound. Appellant also gave the 
victim another capsule, claiming it too was a vitamin pill 
(T. at 19 and 20). Lisa Don Thornwall confirmed Ms. 
Christiansen's account with respect to the party and then 
the pills (T. at 155 and 160). Unlike Ms. Christiansen, 
however, Ms. Thornwall noted that she was home in bed 
within two hours of taking the pills (T. at 160). 
The three left the capitol area and drove to 
appellant's mother's house (T. at 21). Lisa Don Thornwall 
took the car and returned home, leaving appellant with Ms. 
Christiansen (T. at 21). Appellant said that he would get 
a car from his sister. Ms. Christiansen indicated that she 
wanted to use a restroom and appellant responded that his 
mother was asleep. He led the victim around the corner to 
an apartment he described as that of his good friend and his 
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"home away from home." (T. at 22). Appellant went in throu~ 
a window and opened the door. Ms. Christiansen noted that 
at that point she was feeling tired and very dizzy. After 
using the bathroom, she sat down on the couch and passed out 
as appellant stated that he would check to see if his 
sister had returned with the car (T. at 23). 
When Ms. Christiansen came to, appellant was 
standing in the doorway. She got up, .but at his insistance, 
sat down on the floor feeling all the while tired, dizzy and 
weak. Appellant pushed her over and began rubbing lotion 
on her back as he removed her shirt (T. at 23 and 24). The 
victim testified: 
Q. Did you want him to take the 
shirt off? 
A. No. I was just laying there 
on the floor,.I thought I was going 
to pass out again. I was really dizzy. 
I said I didn't want him to take my 
shirt off. 
{T.at24). 
Appellant then removed all Ms. Christiansen's clothes and 
began to rub lotion all over her body (T. at 24). The 
victim described the succeeding events: 
Q. Did you want him to take the 
rest of yorir clothing off? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you do anything to prevent 
him from doing it? 
A. No. 
Q. Why? 
-4-
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A. I felt dizzy, I felt iik~ I was 
going to pass out. I just felt lik~ 
I was asleep. 
Q. Did you tell him you didn't 
want him to take your clothes off? 
A. I told him I didn't want him 
to take my clothes off. 
Q. Did he make any response to 
that statement? 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. Did he do anything in 
response to that statement? 
A. He just took my clothes off. 
Q. Then what happened? 
A. Then he kept rubbing my 
back and putting lotion all over me, 
and started putting it in my hair and 
stuff. And then he laid down on top 
of me, or was laying on my stomach on 
the floor, and he started to have 
intercourse with me. 
Q. Will you describe what you 
mean when you say "have intercourse"?·. 
A. He started--he just laid on 
top of me, and started to have 
intercourse with me. 
Q. Describe what you mean by "have 
intercourse"? 
A. Have sex. His penis was entering 
inside of my body. 
Q. What part of your body? 
A. In my vagina. 
Q. And what occurred at that time? 
-5-
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A. I asked him to stop. And I 
tried to get up, but I just--it was 
like I didn't have any control over 
my muscles. Anu I just. laid there 
on the floor. 
Q. Then what happened? 
A. And.then--then he, then he 
rolled me over so I was on my back, 
and he continued having intercourse 
with me. And then he stopped, and 
he said that he wanted me to have 
oral sex with him. And I said no. 
I said, "I want to go home." I said, 
"Just let me go, I want to go home." 
And so he said, "No," he said, "I 
want you to do this for me." And I 
said, "No, I don't want to. I want to 
go home." 
And then--then he grabbed--I 
tried to get up, he grabbed me and he 
pushed me back down on the floor. And 
he said, you know, "Do it for me." 
And I just said, "No." And I started 
to cry. And he got mad at me. 
Q. At this point how did you feel? 
A. I was scared. And I wanted to 
go home. 
Q. How did you feel physically? 
A. I was sick to my stomach, I 
was dizzy. I started--I could move 
around, I could, you know, sit up. 
Q. Did you make any other effort 
to prevent what he was doing? 
A. I 'tried to get away, and then 
I couldn't get away. 
Q. Why couldn't you? 
A. He was holding me down. And 
then I tried to scream. And he grabbed 
my face, and he put his hand over my 
-6-
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face and he said, "Don't scream" he said, 
"Nobody can hear you, anyway." And he 
started getting really mad at me. 
And then--and then I wouldn't do 
what he was asking me to do. And so 
there was a Michelob bottle sitting on 
the coffee table behind us. 
Q. What is a Michelob bottle? 
A. It's a beer bottle. 
Q. Then what happened? 
A. And he picked that bottle off 
the table, and he started to peel the 
paper off the bottle. And he was still--
he was laying on my back and kind of 
sitting on my feet. And I said, "What 
are you going to do?" I said, "Let me 
go." I said, "I thought we were going 
to go to breakfast." And he said, "No, 
we are not going." And I said, "What are 
you trying to go?" He said, "You know 
what I am going to do." And I said, "What 
are you going to do?" And he said, "I'm 
going to make it easier for you to do 
this." 
And I said, "Let me go." And he said, 
"No." He said, "I know you want ,to do 
this. You are just trying to make me 
mad." And so he took the Michelob bottle, 
and he tried to force it up into my vagina. 
And I arabbed his arm, and I. told him to 
stop, ~nd I told him I'd do what he 
wanted me to do. And so--so then I tried 
to do it for him, and he kept getting 
mad at me and he kept telling me I wasn't 
doing it right. 
Q. Will you describe what it was 
you tried to do for him? 
A. He had me put his penis in my 
mouth and kiss it, and stuff like that. 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Did you actually do that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you want to do that? 
A. No. 
Q. Yfuy didn't you? 
A. I was afraid he was going to 
hurt me. 
Q. All right. Then what happened? 
A. Then I tried--thought if I just 
did that for him, that maybe, you know, he'd 
let me go and I could just leave. And I 
kept trying, but I kept gagging and 
choking. And he'd get made at me and 
tell me that he knew that I knew how to 
do it, and that I was getting sick on 
purpose to make him mad. 
And then he got mad at me, and he 
grabbed me and he forced himself down 
my throat. And then he laid on top of 
me and said that if I didn't make him have 
a climax that I was going to be sorry. And 
so I tried to do what he wanted me to do. 
And then he had a climax in my mouth, and 
I spit it on the floor. And he got mad at 
me. And I said I wanted to go, I wanted 
to go home. And he said--he grabbed me, 
and he said, "Do you love me?" And I said--
I looked at him and I was scared. And 
he said, "I know you love me." He says, 
"You love me, don't you?" And I says, 
"Yes, I do." And then--
Q. Did you love him? 
A. No. 
Q. Why did you say that? 
A. Because I thought maybe that 
he would let me go. I wanted to 
leave, and I would have said anything he 
wanted me to say. 
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Q. And then what happened? 
A. Then I said, "I want to go. 
Let's go out to breakfast or something." 
I wan~ed to get out of the house. And 
he said no. He said, "Come in here." 
And he grabbed me by my arm and he 
pushed me into the other ro~m and 
pushed me down on the bed. And he said 
"Move up to the top of the bed." And I 1 
said, "No, I won't." And he said 
"M " A d I . ' ove up. n said, "No." And then 
he grabbed me, and I passed out again. 
And then later, I woke up, and he was--
he had his arm over the top of me, and 
he was just on the bed next to me, and he 
was asleep or passed out. And so I just 
got off the bed, and I grabbed my clothes, 
I pulled on my shirt and my pants, and 
I grabbed my shoes, and I ran out of the 
house down the street. 
(T. at 25 to 29). 
Ms. Christiansen found some people on the street and, using 
a phone in a lady's house, called her parents who came and 
got her and then called the police (T. at 30). She was 
asked if she made an effort to stop appellant: 
A. As much as I could. 
Q. And what do you mean by that? 
A. I wanted to leave, but I was just 
really tired. I felt like I couldn't 
get up. I tried to get up; I couldn't 
move. When it got later and I started 
to be able to move around more and 
tried to get away, the more violent 
he got, and I didn't want him to hurt 
me. 
Like when I'd push myself up, I'd 
try to get up, he knocked me ~ack 
down on the floor. When I tried to 
scream, he grabbed my face and stop~ed 
me from screaming. He pulled my hair. 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Every time I tried to move away from 
him he just grabbed me and pulled me 
back down~ 
{T. at JO and 31). 
She testified that she had been instructed in a high school 
class to not resist a rapist if she felt she was physically 
unable to make the rapist incapable of hurting her and that 
she had done all she felt she could (T. at 52). 
Ms. Christiansen was examined by Dr. Keith Evens, 
an ob3tetrics-gynecology resident at the University Hospital. 
Although he noted no signs of physical or psychological 
trauma, (T. at 113 and 116), he did note that he was 
unaware that she had been sedated (T. at 116), and that his 
examination took place approximately 12 hours following the 
incident (T. at 112). He also stated that many of the 
normal symptoms of physical abuse would not be visible so 
long after the trauma (T. at 116 and 117). 
During the examination, blood and urine samples 
were taken from the victim and eventually transported to the 
toxicology center at the University of Utah for analysis 
(T. at 61, 63, 64 and 66). Detective Pat Smith carried the 
samples with her for a period of time. (It is unclear from 
the record how long a period since the incident began 1 
on the 27th, (T. at 15) the examination must have taken 
place on the 28th, although it appears from Dr. Evans' 
testimony to have occurred on the 27th. The samples were 
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delivered to toxicology on the 29th. At 
any rate, there was 
a period of one to two days when the samples were carried, 
without refrigeration, in Detective Smith's purse. T'rli:r 
lack of refrigeration 
)owe.~ made the result somewhat 
than a check would have revealed ~ 
hc:tJ beeh "e{ 1--i~(.r-q+J (T. ct+.~q, qs).) 
An associate toxicologist, Ladislav Kopjak, 
testified that analysis of the samples indicated that the 
victim had had chloral hydrate introduced into her body 
(T. at 96 and 99). 
Dr. Brian S. Finkle, director for the University of 
Utah Center for Human Toxicology, testified as to the 
effects of chloral hydrate. He noted that the substance 
quickly breaks down to trichloral ethanol (which was the 
substance tested for an found by Mr. Kopjak). He noted 
that practically the only reason anyone would have trichloral 
ethanol in their system would be because of indigestion of 
chloral hydrate (T. at 103). Dr. Finkle noted: 
. . . the drug chloral hydrate and 
trichloral ethanol which I have explained 
is the active product, is a sedative. 
It is designed deliberately to induce . 
sleep sedation in incividuals, depending 
upon the dose. It is commonly used in 
its sedative dosages to induce or to 
allay anxiety, to relax people, and to 
make them generally sedated--not 
necessarily to go to sleep or to feel 
sleepy, but certainly t~ b~ relaxed. In 
doses higher than that it is often 
-11-
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employed medically to assist people who 
have insomnia, who can't go to sleep at 
night, and they might take a dose of 
this drug such that it would induce 
sleep at about half an hour or an hour 
after they took the drug. 
(T. at 105). 
Dr. Finkle further indicated that "many, many, many manufacturers 
make this drug in many forms--but the usual form is a 
capsule, a soft gelatin capsule, a soft gelatin capsule, 
and it genera1ly comes in two different sizes, and a dose 
could be one capsule of either size." The doses are 500 
milligrams and 1,000 milligrams (T. at 106). 
In consideration of a hypothetical question 
containing the reported concentration of trichloral ethanol 
and the other facts of this case, Dr. Finkle stated: 
(T. 105). 
The concentration that I was given, 
albeit, again ,twelve hours after the 
dosage, would in and of itself, in 
my opinion, have at least induced sedation, 
and could in some subjects have induced 
sleep. Therefore, obviously, as I said 
earlier, the blood concentration, at 
some point, be it prior to the blood 
sample that was taken, was much higher 
than six. I would say that the in-
dividual who had ingested that drug in 
all probability ingested a dose greater 
than that which would have been given 
by a physician for medical purpose, and 
subsequent blood concentration would 
have been such, certainly, as to have 
made them drowsy and possibly would 
have put them to sleep. 
-12-
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Preston J. Truman, the host of the party attended 
by the victim, appellant, and Lisa Don Thornwall, testified 
that he was under the care of a physician and had been 
prescribed chloral hydrate as a sedative. He noted that 
the chloral hydrate was in the form of a gelatin football-
shaped green capsule. His pills were kept in plain sight 
in his bathroom. The inventory after the incident revealed 
that he was short by about seven capsules the quantity he 
should have had if he had been taking them at the prescribed 
level (T. at 122 to 124). 
After consideration of the evidence, the jury 
returned a verdict of not guilty of rape, but guilty of 
forcible sodomy (T. at 182). 
-13-
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POINT I 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE JURY FINDING OF GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
The crime of forcible sodomy is set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (1953), as amended: 
(1) A person commits sodomy when he 
engages in any sexual act involving the 
genitals of one person and the mouth or 
anus of another person, regardless of the 
sex of either participant. 
(2) A person commits forcible sodomy 
when he commits sodomy upon another without 
the other's consent. (Emphasis added.) 
Lack of consent is explained in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 
(1953), as amended: 
An act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or 
sexual abuse is without consent of the victim 
under any of the following circumstances: 
(1) When the actor compels the victim to 
submit or participate by force that overcomes 
such earnest resistance as might reasonably 
be expected under the circumstances; or 
(2) The actor compels the victim to submit 
or participate by any threat that would prevent 
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution; 
or 
(3) The victim has not consented and the 
actor knows the victim is unconscious, unaware 
that the act is occurring, or physically 
unable to resist; or 
(4) The actor knows that as a result of 
mental disease or defect, the victim is at the 
time of the act incapable either of 
appraising the nature of the act or of 
resisting it; or 
(5) The actor knows that the victim submits 
or participates because the victim erroneously 
believes that the actor is the victim's spouse; 
or 
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(6) The actor_in~entionally impaired 
the power of the victim to appraise or 
control his or her conduct by administering 
any substance without his or her knowledge; 
or 
(7) 
of age. 
The victim is under fourteen years 
(Emphasis added.) 
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence it 
is well settled that: 
It is the prerogative of the jury to 
judge the weight of the evidence, the 
credibility of the witnesses, and the facts 
to be found therefrom. For a defendant to 
prevail upon a challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence to sustain his conviction, it 
must appear that viewing the evidence and 
all inferences that may reasonably be drawn 
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury, reasonable minds could 
not believe him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. To set aside a verdict it must appear 
that the evidence was so inconclusive or 
unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting 
fairly must have entertained reasonable doubt 
that defendant committed the crime. Unless 
the evidence compels such conclusion as a 
matter of law, the verdict must be sustained. 
State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975) (emphasis added). 
See also State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 908, 909 (Utah 1978); 
State v. Reddish, 550 P.2d 728 (Utah 1976); State v. Harless, 
23 Utah 2d 128, 459 P.2d 210, 211 (1969); and State v. 
Sims, 30 Utah 2d 357, 517 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1974). 
Moreover, this Court has maintained that in a sex 
offense case, a conviction may be based upon the testimony 
of the prosecutrix alone: 
-15-
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In regard to the general charge that 
the evidence does not support the verdict: 
the defendant argues that the conviction 
should be scrutinized with great care 
because it is a charge easy to make and 
hard to defend against; particularly so 
here because important parts of the state's 
case rest entirely upon the testimony of 
the prosecutrix. With that general proposi-
tion we are in accord. But it also should 
be kept in mind that this offense is rarely 
committed in the presence of witnesses and 
often the conviction of the guilty could only 
be had upon the victim's testimony. It has often 
been held that if there is nothing inherently 
contradictory or incredible in her story a 
conviction may rest upon the victim's 
testimony alone. 
State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865, 868 (1959). 
See also State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700, 701-702 (Utah 1977). 
There is nothing inherently contradictory in Ms. 
Christiansen's story and there is more than sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable belief that no reasonable 
doubt existed as to appellant's guilt. Although, as 
appellant notes in his brief on page 10, there is no 
physical evidence to corroborate the fact of intercourse or 
sodomy, neither is there any compelling inconsistency in 
the jury's belief that one or both of the acts took place. 
Evaluation of all the evidence, including the credibility 
of Ms. Christiansen's testimon~ is the sole prerogative of 
the jury and their verdict should not be upset unless such 
a result is compelled by inherent inconsistency. State v. 
Ward, supra. 
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Ms. Christiansen's description of the events 
leading up to the time when she and appellant were left 
alone was corroborated in virtually every detail by 
all witnesses. Her account of her weakened physical 
state exactly accords with Dr. Finkle's description of 
the effect of chloral hydrate (T. at 25-29 and 105). 
Cloral hydrate was found to have been present in her 
system (T. at 96 and 99) and an obvious source for 
the drug was identified (T. at 122-124). 
It is not inconsistent for Ms. Christiansen to 
have felt weak and dizzy and out of control and yet still 
have some ability to talk and move about. Her capacity to 
resist was reduced by the drug. As Dr. Finkle noted, the 
drug: 
is commonly used in its sedative 
dosage to incude or to allay anxiety, to 
relax people, and to make them generally 
sedated ••• not necessarily to go to sleep 
or feel sleepy, but certainly to be relaxed. 
(T. at 105.) 
Although the examining physician found no bruises 
or evidence of physical trauma, he noted that such evidence 
might not be apparent after so long a time and that he was 
not aware at the time of examination of the possibility 
that Ms. Christainsen had been sedated. (T. at 112-117). 
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As to appelldnt's character, he states in his 
brief on page 10 that Ms. Christiansen testified that he 
was concerned about her well-being and refers the reader 
to page 23 of the transcript. Although she said, at that 
point, that he asked, "don't you feel good?", he also asked, 
"are you high?" and then proceeded to get her to sit down on 
the floor and began rubbing lotion on her. Concern for 
her well-being might be one characterization, but a 
more rational one would be concern over whether the 
drug had taken effect. The prosecutrix's testimony as 
to appellant being "nice" was in response to the question 
concerning how she felt about him at the party before 
the incident (T. at 39). Detective Smith did say in 
direct examination for the defense that appellant was 
cooperative, but that is all: 
Q. Okay. Now, you talked to Charley 
about this occurrence, didn't you? 
(T. at 130.) 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he was cooperative at all times? 
A. Yes. 
Ms. Visick stated that appellant was concerned and 
helped search for Ms. Christiansen (T. at 143) but such 
action could easily be explained as an attempt to cover up 
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or avoid prosecution for what he had just done. rt simply 
does not follow, from what the various witnesses said about 
appellant's disposition, that a reasonable person must 
entertain a reasonable doubt that he would have committed 
the crime. 
Ms. Christiansen's lack of consent was established 
under any of several subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-406, supra. Subsection (1) requires that the actor: 
II 
• compel the victim to submit or participate by force 
that overcomes such earnest resistance as might reasonably 
be expected under the circumstances.u The victim was weak 
and dizzy (T. at 25). She had been instructed in school 
to not resist when resistance appeared hopeless (T. at 52). 
Given that she was substantially incapacitated, she gave as 
much resistance as could be expected under the circumstances. 
Subsection (2) requires that the actor " ••• compel 
the victim to submit or participate by any threat that would 
prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution." 
Here again, the evidence indicates that appellant threatened 
Ms. Christiansen with the beer bottle and physical violence 
(T. at 27). She was in no way capable of resisting such 
force. The jury was justified in believing that a person of 
ordinary resolution might submit in the face of such threats 
under those conditions. 
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Appellant was shown, finally, to have giv2n two 
capsules to both Ms. Christiansen and Ms. Thornwall, 
representing them to be vitamins when they were, in all 
probability, chloral hydrate (T. at 19, 20, 155 and 160). 
Subsection (6) of Section 76-5-406 requires that the actor 
intentionally impair "the power of the victim to appraise 
or control his or her conduct by administering any 
substance without his or her knowledge." 
Proof of lack of consent requires that the state 
establish only one of the subsections of Section 76~5-406. 
In this case, the facts satisfy three. Clearly, there 
was more than sufficient evidence to establish the victim's 
lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364 P.2d 109 
(1961), may be distinguished and is not determinative in 
the instant case. In that case the victim, a 21 year old 
woman supposedly struggled and fought with the defendant 
for over three hours and yet her son sleeping in the next 
room was not disturbed. There was no evidence of marks 
or bruises, and the complaint was not made until two and 
one-half hours after the supposed rape. There was no 
indication of any use of drugs in that case. In the instant 
matter, however, it was established that the victim was 
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drugged with a sedative. As soon as she recovered from 
the effects of the drug she grabbed her clothes and ran 
to a phone (T. at 29). Although, as in Horne, there was 
no physical evidence of a struggle nor of a vigorous 
attempt to seek help and there was some time delay in 
making the complaint. The absence of such evidence and 
the delay can easily be explained by the effect of the 
sedative. Unlike the account of the prosecutrix in Horne, 
Ms. Christiansen's story is neither improbable nor 
inherently contradictory. 
CONCLUSION 
In reviewing a case where the appellant claims 
insufficient evidence the conviction should only be set 
aside when a reasonable mind would be compelled to have 
a reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt. A convic-
tion based upon the prosecutrix's testimony alone in a sex 
offense case should be upheld unless the story is inherently 
contradictory or incredible. In light of these standards, 
the instant conviction must be affirmed. The victim's 
description of the appearance and effect of the drugs 
was corroborated by expert testimony. Chloral hydrate 
was shown to have been introduced into her system. The 
presence of the drug explains the victim's inability to 
make strenuous efforts to resist or escape and the delay 
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in reporting the crime. The delay in reporting accounts 
for the lack of soreness or bruises. The record does 
not support a conclusion that appellant's character was 
inconsistent with the commission of the crime. The 
victim's lack of consent was established und~r any of three 
of the seven alternative subsections of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-406 (1953), as amended. Clearly, in examining the 
facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the 
conviction and sentence must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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